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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 Kareem Garrett sued prison officials claiming that they 
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and 
that they retaliated against him.  The District Court dismissed 
many of Garrett’s claims for failure to fully exhaust 
administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and dismissed the 
remainder of his claims for failure to satisfy the “short and 
plain statement” requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Because we conclude that the District Court 
erred in dismissing the claims, we will vacate and remand this 
matter for further proceedings. 
I. 
A. 
 On February 14, 2014, Garrett, then a prisoner at SCI 
Houtzdale, filed a six-page pro se civil rights complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Garrett alleged that, 
while incarcerated, he had been prescribed a wheelchair and 
walker to assist him with mobility.  Upon being transferred to 
SCI Houtzdale in January 2014, medical staff at that facility 
allegedly discontinued Garrett’s use of a walker and 
wheelchair, forbade him from receiving walking assistance 
from other inmates, and discontinued his “psych” medication.  
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According to Garrett, these decisions severely restricted his 
mobility, caused falls giving rise to further serious injury, and 
prevented him from accessing both medication and food.  In 
addition, he alleged that the medical staff conducted a rectal 
examination without his consent and that this amounted to 
sexual assault.  Garrett named six individual defendants1 and 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory and 
punitive damages.  He acknowledged on the first page of his 
complaint that, although he had filed grievances concerning his 
claims, the grievance process was not complete. 
B. 
On February 24, 2014, Garrett’s complaint was 
transferred to the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, the District in which SCI Houtzdale 
is located.  Garrett filed an amended complaint as of right in 
March 2014, submitting lengthier and more detailed 
allegations and adding additional staff as defendants.2  Garrett 
re-alleged the denial of medication and assistive devices, 
which led to aggravated injuries and serious falls, missed 
meals, the inability to receive medication on the “pill line,” 
                                                 
1 Garrett named Dr. Naji, Debra Younkin, Janet Pearson, 
Deborah Cutshall, Shella Khatri, and Steven Glunt. 
   
2 In addition to the original six defendants, Garrett named 
Wexford Health, Superintendent Cameron, Deputy 
Superintendent Close, K. Hollinbaugh, Doretta Chencharick, 
Joel Barrows, L.S. Kerns-Barr, Jack Walmer, M.J. Barber, Mr. 





denial of access to previously prescribed medications, and the 
inability to bathe himself.  And he included new claims.  For 
instance, he alleged that staff issued him “misconducts” for 
asking for assistance with walking and that they declined to 
provide health care after falls and laughed when he fell and 
struggled on the floor.  He also alleged that he experienced 
retaliation for filing grievances and for pursuing his § 1983 
complaint.  Garrett identified grievances that he had filed 
concerning some of these claims. 
On April 17, 2014, the Secretary’s Office of Inmate 
Grievances and Appeals issued a Final Appeal Decision on 
seven of Garrett’s grievances concerning his alleged 
mistreatment at SCI Houtzdale.3  The Final Appeal Decision 
                                                 
3 The seven grievances included, inter alia, descriptions of the 
following incidents: (1) on January 9, 2014, medical staff 
conducted an unwanted rectal examination amounting to 
sexual assault, and Dr. Naji ordered the denial of a walker and 
ordered Dr. Khatri to discontinue Garrett’s “psych” 
medication; (2) on January 13, 2014, Dr. Naji ordered that 
Garrett’s walker be confiscated, thereby preventing Garrett 
from walking, accessing food, or showering, and causing him 
to suffer injury from falls; (3) on January 17, 2014, Garrett 
urinated on himself and could not properly bathe afterwards 
because Dr. Naji denied him a walker or wheelchair and prison 
officials denied him access to a handicapped-accessible 
shower; (4) on January 18, 2014, Garrett was denied any 
medication stronger than Tylenol for severe back spasms and 
chest and back pain; and (5) on January 23, 2014, Garrett 
suffered adverse health effects from the denial of a wheelchair 
and walker and could not obtain medication or food due to his 
inability to walk. 
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indicates that “[Garrett’s] concern of not being provided proper 
medical care was reviewed along with [his] medical record by 
the staff of the Bureau of Health Care Services.  It was 
determined that the medical care provided was reasonable and 
appropriate. . . .  No evidence of neglect or deliberate 
indifference has been found.”4  Joint Appendix (“JA”) 163. 
C. 
 Soon thereafter, on June 3, 2014, Garrett filed a second 
amended complaint (SAC), having been granted leave from the 
District Court to do so.  The SAC named more than forty 
defendants.5  Garrett once again complained of inadequate 
medical treatment, including the withholding of a walker and 
wheelchair.  He alleged that staff did not provide treatment 
after falls, relegated him to solitary confinement for asking for 
                                                 
 
4 Additional final grievance appeal decisions resolving other, 
similar grievances were issued throughout the summer and fall 
of 2014. 
5 The SAC named the following defendants: Dr.  Naji, Debra 
Younkin, Janet Pearson, Deb Cutshall, Shella Khatri, P.A. Joe, 
P.A. Casey, Nurse Lori, Nurse Debbie, Nurse Rodger, Nurse 
John, Nurse Hanna, Superintendent Cameron, Steven Glunt, 
David Close, K. Hollinbaugh, Dorretta Chencharick, Joel 
Barrows, James Morris, Peggy Bachman, Tracey Hamer, 
Captain Brumbaugh, Captain Miller, Lt. Shea, Lt. Horton, Lt. 
Lewis, Lt. Glass, L.S. Kerns-Barr, F. Nunez, Jack Walmer, 
M.J. Barber, Mr. Shetler, Ms. Cogan, Mr. Little, Sgt. Snipes, 
Sgt. James, Sgt. Young, Medical Officer London, Medical 
Officer Owens, Security Officer Garvey, Officer Uncles, and 
unidentified “operational staff.” 
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help walking, and denied him meals.  He added descriptions of 
additional incidents, including an occasion on March 20, 2014, 
when medical staff left him strapped to a stretcher for nine 
hours without treatment, unable to move or relieve himself and, 
later, denied him access to a handicapped-accessible shower in 
which to clean up after soiling himself.  Garrett also alleged 
that he was denied access to a “disability gym” as part of his 
medical treatment.  The SAC averred that Garrett had 
“[e]xhaust[ed] [a]ll [a]dministrative [r]emedies.”  JA 89. 
Several groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss 
the SAC.  In December 2014, Garrett requested a stay until 
after his expected release in March 2015 in order to attempt to 
obtain private counsel.6  The Magistrate Judge granted the stay 
request and directed that Garrett must respond to the motions 
to dismiss by May 15, 2015.7  In April, Garrett sought an 
additional stay, which the Magistrate Judge granted. 
On July 15, 2015, Garrett notified the District Court that 
he had been released on May 19, 2015.  He also moved to lift 
the stay and for appointment of counsel.  The Magistrate Judge 
lifted the stay, denied the counsel motion without prejudice, 
directed Garrett to update his financial information in light of 
                                                 
6 Garrett previously had moved three times for the appointment 
of counsel.  The Magistrate Judge denied each motion without 
prejudice.   
 
7 Although the District Court did not rule on the other motions 
to dismiss, it granted a motion to dismiss filed by Wexford 
Health, concluding that Garrett had erroneously named an 
incorrect entity that does not provide medical care to prisoners 
at SCI Houtzdale.  Garrett has not appealed that dismissal. 
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his release from prison, and set a deadline for Garrett to 
respond to the motions to dismiss. 
 Garrett timely responded to the motions to 
dismiss and again sought to amend the complaint.  In February 
2016, the Magistrate Judge granted his motion to amend. 
D. 
The Third Amended Complaint (TAC) (which Garrett 
mistakenly titled “Second Amended Complaint”) was 
docketed on February 5, 2016.  In the TAC, in addition to 
pursuing relief under § 1983, Garrett added a reference to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The TAC added 
more than thirty additional defendants,8 realleged the prior 
claims concerning the alleged denial of medical care, and 
added several supplemental claims, including claims of 
                                                 
8 In addition to those named in the SAC, the TAC added 
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Nurse Rich, Nurse Barnes, 
Nurse Rob Simongton, Nurse John Altemus, Nurse Lisa 
Hanna, Nurse Gray, Dr. Haresh Pandya, Dr. William 
Bainbridge, Dr. Nail [sic] Fisher, Dr. Ralph W. Smith, Dr. 
Muhammad Golsorkhi, Dr. Jafar M., Physician Frederick, 
Peter Clernick, D.O., Dean Moesh, M.D., Nurse Joyce, Warren 
Gross, M.D., L.F., Rochelle Rosen, M.D., James Collins, 
M.D., Paul Noel, III, M.D., R. Mechack, P.A., Supervisor Bob, 
Nurse Jose, Nurse Grimley, John Wetzel, John Sawtelle, Robin 
Lewis, Rebecca Reifer, Sgt. White, C.O. Kowaryk, Officer 
Blackson, Sgt. Chappell, Officer Hunt, Sgt. Woomer, Sgt. 





retaliation.9  Garrett alleged that he had filed grievances as to 
some of these claims, and the record reflects that he had fully 
exhausted at least three of them prior to his release. 
Several groups of defendants again filed motions to 
dismiss.  In support of dismissal, defendants Khatri, Dr. Naji, 
Cutshall, Thornley, and Nagel (collectively referred to as the 
Medical Defendants10) argued that the complaint should be 
dismissed for failure to properly exhaust administrative 
remedies under the PLRA.  The Magistrate Judge converted 
the Medical Defendants’ motions to motions for summary 
                                                 
9 Among the newly added allegations were descriptions of the 
following incidents: (1) on April 10, 2014, two officials 
(Woomer and Defelice) told other inmates to stop helping 
Garrett walk and, when he fell as a result, Woomer told him to 
“crawl like a dog,” JA 142; (2) on April 24, 2014, an official 
(Hunt) retaliated against Garrett by threatening him and calling 
him a racial slur for having other inmates assist him and 
because he engaged in protected activities (i.e., filing 
grievances); (3) on May 11, 2014, medical staff (Rich, Rodger, 
and Barnes) intentionally tampered with Garrett’s medical 
records to hide the results of an abnormal EKG reading and 
refused to provide adequate treatment for chest pain and a 
possible coronary condition; (4) on June 15, 2014, an official 
(James) awoke Garrett by slamming him on the chest to deliver 
a written misconduct in retaliation for filing grievances; and 
(5) on July 9, 2014, prison officials (McClellan, Hunt, Young, 
and Barber) denied Garrett access to a handicapped-accessible 
shower, after which he fell and injured himself. 
 




judgment.  The remaining defendants (collectively referred to 
as the Corrections Defendants) did not assert an administrative 
exhaustion defense.  Instead, the Corrections Defendants 
argued that the TAC failed to comply with Rules 8 and 12 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and argued that they were 
entitled to dismissal or, in the alternative, to a more definite 
statement under Rule 12(e). 
On July 14, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued a report 
and recommendation (R&R) recommending that the claims 
against the Medical Defendants be dismissed for failure to fully 
exhaust administrative remedies.  Relying upon our decision in 
Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002), the 
Magistrate Judge concluded that Garrett’s status as a prisoner, 
and the status of the administrative grievance process, must be 
considered as of the time Garrett filed his original complaint 
(February 2014), not as of the filing of the TAC (February 
2016).  Thus, although many of Garrett’s claims were 
administratively exhausted and he was no longer in prison by 
the time he filed the TAC, the Magistrate Judge recommended 
that summary judgment be granted in favor of the Medical 
Defendants based on Garrett’s initial failure to exhaust. 
As to the Corrections Defendants, the Magistrate Judge 
observed that the TAC consisted of 36 typewritten pages 
containing 90 paragraphs, “yet there is virtually no detail as to 
who did what and the dates of when the violations allegedly 
occurred.”  JA 9.  The R&R noted that Garrett had cited the 
ADA but had purported to file his complaint only under § 1983, 
that the TAC contained references to injunctive relief, which 
was moot due to Garrett’s release, and that the TAC referred to 
the prior iterations of the complaints as “supplemental” to the 
original complaint, rather than as amendments.  In addition, the 
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R&R observed that the TAC referred to more than 60 
defendants, but only 37 had been served. 
The Magistrate Judge determined that requiring the 
Corrections Defendants to respond to the TAC’s allegations as 
pleaded would be unreasonable, and therefore recommended 
granting the motion for a more definite statement.  She 
expressly cautioned Garrett that this last opportunity to amend 
should not be viewed as an invitation to add new and unrelated 
allegations or defendants.  She further cautioned that a failure 
to comply would result in dismissal.  Finally, the Magistrate 
Judge stated that any claims against the Corrections 
Defendants, like the claims against the Medical Defendants, 
could be subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust “if [Garrett] 
failed to exhaust those claims prior to bringing this lawsuit.”  
JA 11.  On September 9, 2016, the District Court adopted the 
R&R and issued an appropriate opinion and order. 
E. 
 On November 21, 2016, Garrett filed his Fourth 
Amended Complaint (FAC).  The FAC, at fifteen typewritten 
pages, is less than half the length of the TAC.  Consistent with 
the Magistrate Judge’s instructions, the FAC included dates 
and times for most of the alleged events, trimmed the number 
of defendants,11 and omitted most of the extraneous references 
                                                 
11 Although the FAC names many of the same defendants as 
the TAC, Garrett did not include seventeen individuals who 
had been named in the TAC (Dr. William Bainbridge, Dr. Nail 
[sic] Fisher, Dr. Ralph W. Smith, Dr. Muhammad Golsorkhi, 
Dr. Jafar M., Physician Frederick, Peter Clernick, D.O., Dean 
Moesh, M.D., Nurse Joyce, Warren Gross, M.D., L.F., 
Rochelle Rosen, M.D., James Collins, M.D., Paul Noel, III, 
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to the ADA and injunctive relief.12  In many paragraphs of the 
FAC, Garrett included a copy of the entire list of more than 
fifty defendants, broadly alleging that all of the defendants 
somehow directly participated in his mistreatment, were aware 
of that mistreatment and did not step in to help him, or 
participated in retaliation against him. 
The FAC also included Garrett’s claims against the 
Corrections Defendants which had first appeared in the TAC.  
Contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s direction, Garrett re-
pleaded the previously dismissed claims against the Medical 
Defendants alleging deliberate indifference to his medical 
needs beginning in January 2014.  Garrett did, however, adhere 
to her instruction not to present new claims in the FAC.  
                                                 
M.D., R. Mechack, P.A., Supervisor Bob, Nurse Jose, and 
Nurse Grimley). 
 
12 Garrett has not raised any arguments on appeal concerning 
an ADA claim.  We therefore regard that claim as abandoned.  
See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Garrett’s counsel also has not raised any arguments on appeal 
concerning the FAC’s reference to injunctive relief.  To the 
extent Garrett’s initial pro se appeal brief raised arguments 
concerning a right to injunctive relief, we agree with the 
Magistrate Judge that any request for injunctive relief is moot 
due to Garrett’s release.  See, e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 
236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (claims for injunctive 
relief generally become moot when the inmate is no longer at 
the facility being complained of).  We therefore affirm the 




On June 12, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued yet 
another R&R.  In it, she again recommended dismissal of the 
claims against the Medical Defendants for the same reason she 
had previously given—Garrett’s failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies as of the initial February 2014 filing 
date.13  She recommended that the claims against the 
Corrections Defendants also be dismissed because “Plaintiff 
has utterly failed to once again comply with Rule 8,” 
concluding that the FAC was neither “short” nor “plain.”  JA 
22.  She also concluded that the FAC lacks the facial 
plausibility to survive a motion to dismiss.  The Magistrate 
Judge stated: “Plaintiff’s factual and legal allegations are, to a 
substantial extent, incomprehensible.  There is still virtually no 
detail as to who did what and when.”  JA 22.  She therefore 
recommended that the FAC be dismissed in its entirety for 
failure to comply with Rule 8. 
On October 11, 2017, the District Court overruled 
Garrett’s objections to the R&R, adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendations, dismissed the claims against the 
Medical Defendants for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies, dismissed the claims against the Corrections 
                                                 
13 Given his pro se status, we do not fault Garrett for repleading 
his claims against the Medical Defendants in the FAC despite 
the Magistrate Judge’s instruction to the contrary.  Repleading 
preserved the dismissal of those claims for our appellate 
review.  See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 
2017) (recognizing that a party should take affirmative 
measures to ensure the preservation of dismissed claims in a 
subsequent amended pleading). 
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Defendants pursuant to Rule 8, and closed the case.  Garrett 
timely appealed.14  
II.15 
The PLRA provides in relevant part:  “No action shall 
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  Because he was a prisoner in February 
2014, the PLRA applied to Garrett when he filed his original 
complaint.  The grievance process was not complete as of that 
date.  But Garrett later was released from prison, and 
subsequently filed the TAC (and, later, the FAC).  Nonetheless, 
the District Court interpreted the PLRA’s “[n]o action shall be 
                                                 
14 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Because this appeal is taken from the District Court’s 
final judgment, we have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s judgment and the interlocutory orders that merge into 
the final judgment.  See Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 220; In re 
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider both the District 
Court’s dismissal of the TAC as well as its dismissal of the 
FAC. 
15 We extend our gratitude to Justin Berg of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School and Stuart Steinberg and Cory Ward 
of Dechert LLP for donating their time and talent in accepting 
this pro bono appointment and for zealously representing 




brought” language to require that administrative exhaustion be 
complete as of the filing of the initial complaint, regardless of 
whether the complaint is supplemented or amended after a 
change in the plaintiff’s custody status.16  We review the 
District Court’s interpretation of the PLRA de novo.  Abdul-
Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
A. 
 Garrett’s TAC served two functions.  It presented 
additional claims arising out of the events described in the 
                                                 
16  We note that we have allowed complaints filed prematurely 
to be dismissed without prejudice and then refiled when the 
administrative remedies were exhausted.  “[O]ur pre-PLRA 
cases involving exhaustion by federal prisoners have stated 
that ‘[i]f . . . the administrative remedy has not been exhausted, 
the complaint should be dismissed without prejudice to its 
reinstatement [after exhaustion].’”  Ghana v. Holland, 226 
F.3d 175, 184 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Veteto v. Miller, 794 
F.3d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1986)).  We then, in a post-PLRA case, 
concluded that “District Court[s] must continue to follow the 
procedures mandated by our pre-PLRA cases.”  Shane v. 
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000).  We noted that “we 
are not aware of any specific support in the legislative history 
for the proposition that Congress also wanted the courts to 
dismiss claims that may have substantive merit but were 
inartfully pled.”  Id.  Had the District Court here simply 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice, then allowed 
Garrett to refile once he had exhausted his administrative 
remedies, this case may have been able to be resolved in a more 




original complaint, but which Garrett had not set forth in prior 
pleadings.  It also presented new facts and claims that arose 
only after the filing of the original complaint, including 
Garrett’s release from prison.  Accordingly, under Rules 15(a) 
and 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the TAC 
became both an amended complaint and a supplemental 
complaint.17  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), 15(d).  We therefore 
                                                 
17 The Medical Defendants argue that the TAC cannot qualify 
as a supplemental complaint under Rule 15(d) because Garrett 
did not file a motion seeking leave to supplement.  We 
disagree.  It is true that when Garrett filed his motion for leave 
to amend, he neither titled the motion as a request to 
supplement nor referred to Rule 15(d).  But, when he filed that 
motion, he included a copy of his proposed TAC.  The TAC 
includes an entire section devoted to “Plaintiff[’s] Complaints 
Supplemental to Presented Medical Complaints” in which 
Garrett alleges retaliation since the filing of the original 
complaint.  JA 150.  In addition, while the TAC does not 
directly discuss Garrett’s release, it mentions his parole date—
a date which had passed by the time he filed the motion for 
leave to amend.  It also reflects his private address rather than 
a prison address.  Thus, the proposed TAC contained 
supplemental facts and claims that occurred after the initial 
filing date, and the Magistrate Judge was aware of those 
supplemental facts and claims when she granted Garrett leave 
to file it.  And although she chastised Garrett for including new 
claims in the TAC, she did not strike them.  Accordingly, and 
particularly in light of Garrett’s pro se status and our policy of 
considering motions based on their substance rather than their 
title, see Lewis v. Att’y Gen., 878 F.2d 714, 722 n.20 (3d Cir. 
1989) (“A pleading will be judged by its substance rather than 
according to its form or label.”) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. 
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begin our discussion by considering the purpose and effect of 
filing a supplemental or amended complaint under Rule 15. 
 “The function of Rule 15(a), which provides generally 
for the amendment of pleadings, is to enable a party to assert 
matters that were overlooked or were unknown at the time the 
party interposed the original complaint.”  6 C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1473 (3d ed. 2019).  
Rule 15(a) embodies the federal courts’ policy of liberal 
pleading amendment by ensuring that an inadvertent error in, 
or omission from, an original pleading will not preclude a party 
from securing relief on the merits of his claim.  Arthur v. 
Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2006).  In general, an 
amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders 
the original pleading a nullity.  Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 220; 
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1476.  Thus, the most recently filed 
amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.  See W. 
Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 
F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013).  It has long been the rule then 
that where a party’s status determines a statute’s applicability, 
it is his status at the time of the amendment and not at the time 
of the original filing that determines whether a statutory 
precondition to suit has been satisfied.18  See, e.g., Mo., K&T 
Railway Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 575 (1913) (amended 
                                                 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286 (1969)), we 
conclude that Garrett properly invoked Rule 15(d) and that his 
TAC was, in part, a supplemental complaint. 
18 Of course, the original pleading is not entirely without effect. 
When the original pleading has been superseded, an amended 
pleading still may relate back to the filing date of the original 




petition related back to commencement of action and cured 
initially improper pleading); New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. 
Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1503 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (subject matter jurisdiction must be reassessed as of 
the filing of the amended complaint). 
Rule 15(d) operates in conjunction with Rule 15(a).  
Upon motion and reasonable notice, Rule 15(d) allows a court 
to grant a party the ability to “serve a supplemental pleading 
setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened 
after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(d).  Thus, rather than set forth additional events that 
occurred before the original complaint was filed, as does a Rule 
15(a) amendment, a supplemental pleading under Rule 15(d) 
presents more recent events.  Rule 15(d) thus promotes a 
complete adjudication of the dispute between the parties.  See 
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 
668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Rule 15(d) expressly provides that supplementation 
may be permitted “even though the original pleading is 
defective in stating a claim or defense.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).  
Supplementation under Rule 15(d) therefore can be employed 
to allege subsequent facts to cure a deficient pleading.  See 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75 & n.8 (1976) (recognizing 
that plaintiff who had not satisfied “a nonwaivable condition 
of jurisdiction” before filing suit had subsequently satisfied the 
condition, so “[a] supplemental complaint in the District Court 
would have eliminated this jurisdictional issue”); see also, e.g., 
U.S. ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (discussing the use of Rule 15(d) to add newly 
arising facts to cure pleading defects such as lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction or standing).   
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Our recent decision in T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of 
Wilmington, Del., 913 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2019), illustrates the 
operation of Rule 15(d) to cure an initially defective complaint.  
There, T Mobile sought to proceed in district court pursuant to 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), which permits a 
disappointed wireless service provider to seek review of a 
zoning board decision “within 30 days after” a zoning 
authority’s “final action.”  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).  
T Mobile filed its complaint within 30 days after the zoning 
board’s oral decision, not waiting for the subsequent written 
decision, which followed nearly a year later.  T Mobile, 913 
F.3d at 316–17.  The District Court concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed, despite T Mobile’s later-filed 
supplemental complaint addressing the issuance of the final 
written decision.  Id. at 317. 
On appeal, we agreed with the District Court that the 
board’s written decision constituted the appealable “final 
action” under the TCA, and so T Mobile’s complaint was not 
yet ripe when it was originally filed.  Id. at 318, 323.  We 
determined that the TCA’s 30-day filing requirement is non-
jurisdictional, so the later-filed supplemental complaint, which 
T Mobile belatedly filed more than 30 days after the board’s 
“final action,” was not necessarily barred.  Id. at 324.  We then 
concluded that T Mobile’s supplemental complaint could—
and did—relate back to the date of the initial complaint to cure 
its initial unripeness.  Id. at 326. 
We observed that the District Court’s decision to grant 
T Mobile’s motion to supplement its complaint under Rule 
15(d) was a proper exercise of its discretion.  Indeed, we 
described the decision as “just” because the defendant “had 
long since had notice of the event—the filing of the written 
denial—that occurred after the initial pleading.”  Id.  
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Moreover, Rule 15(d)’s express terms permit supplementation 
where an original pleading is defective.  Id. 
Although Rule 15(d) does not expressly indicate 
whether or when a supplemental pleading can relate back to the 
original complaint, we determined that “case law and 
secondary sources have long instructed that once a 
supplemental complaint is granted, it is treated like an 
amended complaint for purposes of relation back.”  Id. at 327.  
Thus, like an amended complaint, a supplemental complaint 
may “relate back” when it “asserts a claim or defense that arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or 
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(c)(1)(B).  Because T Mobile’s original and supplemental 
complaints both “rel[ied] on the same core facts,” relation back 
was proper. T Mobile, 913 F.3d at 328. 
As T Mobile makes clear, a supplemental complaint 
under Rule 15(d) that relates back to the original complaint 
may cure the filing defect in the original complaint.  Id.  We 
observed that this is consistent with the policy underlying Rule 
15:  “The clear preference embodied in Rule 15 is for merits-
based decision making.”  Id.  We also noted that many courts 
have permitted the use of relation back to address and cure 
filing defects, for instance, by permitting a party to re-plead to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction or to drop a party that 
would bar the exercise of diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 328–29.  
This preference for merits-based decision making and the 
historical use of Rule 15(d) to cure filing defects militated in 
favor of a conclusion that T Mobile’s untimely supplemental 




When we apply the logic of T Mobile to Garrett’s case, 
the outcome is clear.  Garrett’s original complaint was 
defective because, although he was a prisoner when he filed it, 
he failed to first exhaust his administrative remedies by 
completing the prison grievance process then in effect.  Two 
years later, Garrett filed an amended and supplemental 
complaint—the TAC—pursuant to Rule 15.  The TAC, as the 
operative amended pleading, superseded Garrett’s prior 
complaints.  Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 220.  Both the amended 
and supplemental claims in the TAC relate back to the original 
complaint because they concern the same core operative facts 
of which the Medical Defendants long had notice.19  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1); T Mobile, 913 F.3d at 328.  When he filed 
the TAC, Garrett was no longer a prisoner and therefore was 
not subject to the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion 
                                                 
19 Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations applies to 
Garrett’s § 1983 claims.  See Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of 
Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  Many of the events 
giving rise to Garrett’s claims occurred in January 2014, and 
the TAC was filed in February 2016, more than two years later.  
Because we conclude that the TAC relates back under Fed. R. 




requirement.20  Thus, because it relates back to the original 
complaint, the TAC cures the original filing defect.21  Id.  
                                                 
20 As previously noted, the TAC does not explicitly allege that 
Garrett was a non-prisoner at the time he filed it, although that 
fact is obvious from the face of the TAC.  See supra note 16.  
The absence of an express allegation does not impact our 
analysis.  It was well known to the defendants and to the 
District Court that Garrett had been released before he filed the 
TAC; he provided written notice advising of that fact.  
Moreover, it was not Garrett’s obligation to plead his status as 
a non-prisoner because the PLRA is not the source of his claim.  
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007).  Rather, as the 
Supreme Court explained in Bock, the onus is on a defendant 
to raise administrative exhaustion as an affirmative defense.  
Id.  Logically, an individual’s status as a prisoner or non-
prisoner for purposes of the applicability of the PLRA’s 
administrative exhaustion provision also cannot be an 
affirmative pleading requirement.  Garrett appropriately 
argued his status as a non-prisoner in response to the Medical 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC. 
 
21 A recent decision by the Tenth Circuit, May v. Segovia, 929 
F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2019), takes a contrary view of the 
operation of Rule 15.  In May, the Court decided that Rule 15 
relates back to the original complaint for purposes of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, concluding that an amended 
complaint “supersedes the original complaint’s allegations but 
not its timing.”  Id. at 1229 (emphasis in original).  In addition, 
the May Court took the view that relation back for purposes of 
cure is only permissible when the pleading flaw is 




 Before we may undertake the fairly straightforward 
Rule 15 analysis, we must resolve an issue which the 
Magistrate Judge recognized in her first R&R.  A precedential 
opinion of this Court can be read to suggest that the § 1997e(a) 
administrative exhaustion requirement undermines the usual 
operation of Rule 15, so that a complaint that is defective for 
failure to satisfy the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion 
requirement cannot be cured.  Specifically, according to the 
Magistrate Judge, under Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201 
(3d Cir. 2002), “Plaintiff’s status as a ‘prisoner’ is determined 
at the time his complaint is ‘brought’ or filed in court.”22  JA 
                                                 
requirement.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit’s approach is at odds with 
our decision in T Mobile.  We therefore decline to adopt it. 
 
22 Given the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion (adopted by the 
District Court) that Garrett could never have cured his initially 
defective complaint, we find it perplexing that Garrett was 
repeatedly granted leave to amend.  The Medical Defendants 
first raised their exhaustion defense in November 2014, and, 
rather than permitting multiple amendments over the course of 
nearly two years, the District Court could have promptly 
considered the defense and denied further amendments as 
futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 
(3d Cir. 2002) (leave to amend need not be provided where 
amendment would be inequitable or futile).  Had that court 
done so, the parties would have benefitted from a more prompt 
disposition.  For example, Garrett could have filed a new 
complaint after exhaustion was complete but before both his 
release and the running of the statute of limitations.  But this 
observation has no impact here because, as we will discuss, we 
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6.  We therefore consider the import of Ahmed and its effect, if 
any, on Garrett’s case. 
In Ahmed, the plaintiff filed grievances against two 
prison officials alleging excessive force but failed to complete 
the grievance appeal process.  He then filed a § 1983 
complaint.  The District Court dismissed the complaint without 
prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
pursuant to the PLRA.  Ahmed did not appeal the dismissal.  
Subsequently, the statute of limitations for Ahmed’s claim 
expired and he was released from prison.  Only then did Ahmed 
move in the District Court for leave to file an amended 
complaint.  He proposed that his amended complaint should 
relate back to the date of the initial complaint, to reflect both 
an untimely effort to appeal his grievance as well as his release 
from prison.  The District Court denied the post-judgment 
motion, and Ahmed appealed.  
We observed that, although the dismissal of the 
complaint was without prejudice and therefore was not 
immediately appealable, it became a final and appealable 
judgment after the statute of limitations expired.  297 F.3d at 
207.  Once the dismissal became a final judgment, Ahmed 
could no longer invoke Rule 15 because that rule is not 
intended to permit the post-judgment amendment of a 
complaint.  Id. at 207–08.  Rather, following entry of judgment, 
Rule 59 and Rule 60 govern post-judgment proceedings.  Id. at 
208.  We therefore construed Ahmed’s motion as seeking relief 
under Rule 60 and considered whether the District Court’s 
denial of the motion was an abuse of its discretion.  Id. at 209.  
                                                 
do not agree with the District Court’s underlying conclusion 




We concluded it was not. 
Specifically, we observed that allegations concerning 
Ahmed’s untimely appeal of the grievance would not have 
cured his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Id. at 209.  
We rejected Ahmed’s argument that his proposed post-
judgment amendment would have demonstrated “substantial 
compliance” with the exhaustion requirement as discussed in 
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77–78 (3d Cir. 2000).  We 
observed, “[w]hatever the parameters of ‘substantial 
compliance’ referred to [in Nyhuis], it does not encompass a 
second-step appeal five months late nor the filing of a suit 
before administrative exhaustion, however late, has been 
completed.”  Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 209.  We therefore concluded 
that Ahmed’s proffered post-judgment amendment of the 
complaint could not cure its defect.  Id. 
We also concluded that a post-judgment amendment 
incorporating the fact of Ahmed’s release would not have 
cured the defect in the initial complaint.  We acknowledged the 
Commonwealth’s concession that Ahmed would not have been 
barred from filing a new § 1983 complaint following his 
release, and that any new matter would not have been subject 
to the PLRA’s strictures.  But we declared that Ahmed was 
“bound by the PLRA because his suit was filed . . . almost three 
years before he was released from prison.”  Id. at 210. 
In applying Ahmed to Garrett’s case, the District Court 
concluded that the filing of the initial complaint was the 
unalterable starting point from which to consider a plaintiff’s 
status as a prisoner.  This over-reads Ahmed, the post-judgment 
posture of which renders it inapposite to Garrett’s case. 
Ahmed was a prisoner subject to the PLRA when he 
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filed his complaint, and he remained a prisoner subject to the 
PLRA when the District Court entered its final judgment.  
Because he sought to reopen a final judgment, the policy 
favoring the finality of judgments was implicated.  The 
permissive policy favoring amendment under Rule 15 was 
simply not relevant.  See Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen 
a Rule 15 motion comes after a judgment against the plaintiff, 
. . . Courts . . . must consider[] the competing interest of 
protecting the finality of judgments and the expeditious 
termination of litigation.” (emphasis and internal quotation 
omitted)); see also 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1489 (3d ed. 2019) (“To hold [that Rule 15 
permits amendment after judgment] would enable the liberal 
amendment policy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that 
is contrary to the philosophy favoring finality of judgments and 
the expeditious termination of litigation.”). 
In the post-judgment context, the narrow grounds for 
relief set forth in Rules 59 and 60 must guide a District Court’s 
decision about whether an otherwise-final judgment should be 
disturbed.  Indeed: 
If a permissive amendment policy applied after 
adverse judgments, plaintiffs could use the court 
as a sounding board to discover holes in their 
arguments, then ‘reopen the case by amending 
their complaint to take account of the court’s 
decision.’  That would sidestep the narrow 
grounds for obtaining post-judgment relief under 
Rules 59 and 60, make the finality of judgments 
an interim concept and risk turning Rules 59 and 




Leisure Caviar, 616 F.3d at 616 (citations omitted).  Thus, a 
different set of rules emphasizing vastly different policies 
pertained to the motion in Ahmed, and those rules do not apply 
to Garrett’s case. 
C. 
To the extent we were in need of reassurance that the 
District Court’s expansive application of Ahmed is mistaken, 
the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Jones v. Bock, 549 
U.S. 199 (2007), provides such comfort.  Bock does not 
directly address the issues in Garrett’s appeal, nor does it 
overrule Ahmed.  It does, however, offer principles of critical 
importance to our resolution of Garrett’s appeal and how we 
must understand and apply Ahmed. 
In Bock, the Supreme Court considered a series of 
procedural rules that the Sixth Circuit had adopted in an effort 
to implement various aspects of the PLRA, including its 
administrative exhaustion and screening requirements.  The 
Sixth Circuit’s rules required, inter alia, that: (1) a prisoner’s 
complaint must include affirmative proof of exhaustion; (2) the 
prisoner’s grievances must identify every individual who is 
later named in the lawsuit; and (3) no part of the complaint may 
proceed if any single claim is not properly exhausted, and leave 
to amend to proceed with unexhausted claims is not permitted. 
The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach, holding that “adopting different and more onerous 
pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should 
be done through established rulemaking procedures, and not on 
a case-by-case basis by the courts.”  Id. at 224.  Thus, because 
the PLRA did not impose the strict requirements that the Sixth 
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Circuit had adopted, the more generous pleading requirements 
set forth in the Federal Rules controlled. 
Addressing each of the Sixth Circuit’s rules in turn, the 
Supreme Court first held that administrative exhaustion in the 
PLRA context, consistent with the general practice under the 
Federal Rules, is an affirmative defense and not a pleading 
requirement.  Id. at 212.  The Court stated, “we have explained 
that courts should generally not depart from the usual practice 
under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy 
concerns.”  Id.  Furthermore, it held “that the PLRA’s 
screening requirement does not—explicitly or implicitly—
justify deviating from the usual procedural practice beyond the 
departures specified by the PLRA itself.”  Id. at 214.  Indeed, 
in other instances where Congress deviated from the usual 
pleading requirements, “it did so expressly.”  Id. at 216. 
Next, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s 
rule requiring that every defendant must be identified in the 
initial prisoner grievance in order for the complaint to proceed, 
concluding that “the lower court’s procedural rule lacks a 
textual basis in the PLRA.”  Id. at 217.  Rather, the prisoner 
must comply with the particular prison’s grievance procedures, 
whatever those may be, in order to satisfy the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement.  Id. at 218. 
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s 
practice of dismissing the entire complaint when only some 
claims were unexhausted.  Although the practice had some 
support in § 1997e(a), which states that “[n]o action shall be 
brought” unless administrative remedies are exhausted, the 
court was dismissive of this language as “boilerplate” that is 
not sufficient to lead to dismissal of an entire action solely 
because some claims are wanting.  Id. at 220.  Rather, the Court 
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held that the more general rule of practice applies, such that “if 
a complaint contains both good and bad claims, the court 
proceeds with the good and leaves the bad.”  Id. at 221. 
Bock teaches, then, that the usual procedural rules apply 
to PLRA cases unless the PLRA specifies otherwise, and that 
a decision about whether to apply the usual procedural rules 
should not be guided by “perceived policy concerns.”  Id. at 
212.  Applying these important principles, we conclude that the 
PLRA does not override the usual operation of Rule 15 here.  
Accordingly, Garrett’s status as a non-prisoner at the time he 
filed the TAC is determinative of the Medical Defendants’ 
administrative exhaustion defense. 
D. 
 As discussed in Section II.A., the normal operation of 
Rule 15 means that, when filed, Garrett’s TAC became the 
operative pleading.  Because the TAC relates back to Garrett’s 
original complaint, his change in status (i.e., his release) 
operates to cure the original filing defect (i.e., his failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies).  See T Mobile, 913 F.3d at 
328.  There is nothing in the language of § 1997e(a) implicitly 
or explicitly mandating a contrary approach. 
 Our conclusion is consistent with our own case law.  In 
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2009), for 
example, we held that the PLRA cannot alter a rule of civil 
procedure unless it makes an express reference to such a rule, 
or it impliedly repeals it by “clear and manifest” intention to 
do so.23  We therefore concluded that the PLRA does not 
                                                 
23 Hagan, which was decided after Bock, did not directly apply 
Bock. Nonetheless, its analysis and result are consistent with 
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displace the joinder rules set forth in Rule 20 because the 
PLRA makes no reference to joinder, and because there is no 
“irreconcilable conflict” between Rule 20 and the PLRA.  Id. 
at 155.  Analogously, nothing in the PLRA’s administrative 
exhaustion provision mentions Rule 15, much less alters the 
text or operation of the rule. 
Indeed, we followed this approach even before the 
Supreme Court decided Bock.  In Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 2002), and Shane v. 
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2000), we rejected the 
argument that language in the PLRA directing that a court 
“shall dismiss” a complaint under certain circumstances is 
sufficient to override the more general procedural requirement 
under Rule 15 that a litigant is entitled to amendment unless 
amending the complaint would be inequitable or futile.  In 
Grayson, for instance, we concluded: “there is no reason that a 
district court should fail to retain its pre-existing authority 
under [Rule 15] to permit plaintiffs leave to amend.”  Grayson, 
293 F.3d at 111.  Similarly, in Shane, we stated: “we are . . . 
hesitant to conclude that Congress meant to change established 
procedures without a clearer indication than we have here.”  
Shane, 213 F.3d at 117. 
Looking beyond our own case law, a sister Circuit has 
applied Bock to circumstances similar to Garrett’s, and that 
Court reached a conclusion consistent with how we decide the 
instant matter.  In Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 
2017), the Ninth Circuit considered whether Jackson, a 
prisoner who filed an initial complaint before administratively 
                                                 
Bock.  Hagan, like Bock, concludes that the usual procedural 
rules apply to PLRA cases unless the PLRA makes clear that a 
departure from the rules is required. 
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exhausting his claims, and who was granted leave to amend his 
complaint after his release, continued to be subject to the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  As the Ninth Circuit 
summed up the matter, Jackson’s case turned on “whether the 
court should look to the initiation of the suit (when Jackson 
was a prisoner, and had not exhausted his remedies), or to 
Jackson’s operative third amended complaint (filed when 
Jackson was not a prisoner, and the exhaustion requirement did 
not apply).”  Id. at 933. 
The Ninth Circuit observed that the operative complaint 
“completely supersedes” any earlier complaints, and that Bock 
directs that an exhaustion defense under the PLRA should be 
considered within the framework of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Id. at 934.  Applying these principles, the Court 
concluded that Jackson’s “amended complaint, filed when he 
was no longer a prisoner, obviates an exhaustion defense.”  Id.  
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit explicitly chose not 
to follow our opinion in Ahmed, both because Ahmed pre-dates 
Bock and because it did not apply Rule 15.  Id. at 935. 
The Jackson Court dismissed several of the defendants’ 
policy concerns about the potential for its holding to lead to 
litigation abuse by prisoners.  It observed, for instance, that 
Rule 15 permits a District Court discretion to deny leave to 
amend, particularly where a prisoner appears to be “gaming the 
courts” in some manner.  Id. at 936.  In addition, the Court 
observed that an administrative exhaustion requirement after a 
prisoner’s release would not serve the purpose of permitting 
officials to address problems internally because, after release, 
“there is no internal [grievance] process left to undermine.”  Id.  
Because Jackson could have chosen to file a new suit but did 
not do so, his decision to amend promoted judicial economy.  
Id.  Finally—and most importantly—the Ninth Circuit 
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observed that, under Bock, it did not have license to rely on 
policy concerns in carving out exceptions to the Federal Rules 
in any event.  Id. at 937. 
Here, the Medical Defendants contend that we should 
not follow Jackson.  They state that Jackson is “very short” and 
“gave virtually no serious thought to the implications of its 
very simplistic holding,” Med. Def. Supp. Br. 24, arguing that 
the decision overlooked the significant policy concerns at 
stake.  The Medical Defendants express concerns about 
fairness, observing that they promptly raised their exhaustion 
defense long before Garrett was released from prison.  But, 
they contend, only because the District Court granted Garrett 
both a stay and several opportunities to amend, the District 
Court did not issue its ruling until after his release.  In addition, 
they argue that permitting supplementation after release would 
create an incentive for prisoner-plaintiffs to delay proceedings 
until their release.  Id. at 28.  These arguments are 
unpersuasive. 
The decision of whether to permit a plaintiff to file an 
amended or supplemental complaint under Rule 15 is within a 
District Court’s discretion and is guided by Rule 15’s liberal 
standards.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should 
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”).  
Garrett filed his TAC and FAC with leave of court.  Rule 15 
permits the District Court discretion to deny additional 
amendments (after the initial amendment as of right, see Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)) precisely so that litigants will not try to 
game the system by improperly delaying a case or otherwise 
causing prejudice to a defendant’s validly raised defenses.  As 
the Jackson court aptly observed, “[d]istrict court discretion is 
critical to assessing the fairness of amended pleadings.”  870 
F.3d at 936. 
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The Medical Defendants also worry that departments of 
corrections, in denying release to prisoners, will be accused of 
doing so solely for the improper reason of preserving their 
exhaustion defense.  Furthermore, according to Dr. Khatri, we 
should consider a plaintiff’s prisoner status only at the time of 
the initial complaint because: (1) an individual’s confinement 
status might change during the course of the litigation; (2) 
looking to confinement status at the time of the initial filing 
serves judicial economy; and (3) a contrary conclusion would 
“provide[] a loophole to the Statute which was not intended by 
Congress,” Khatri Supp. Br. 22; see also Harris v. Garner, 216 
F.3d 970, 981 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[T]he intent of 
Congress . . . was to reduce the number of prisoner lawsuits 
filed.”). 
The problem with these arguments is that they are the 
sort of “perceived policy concerns” that the Supreme Court has 
directed cannot dictate whether we apply the usual pleading 
rules.24  See Bock, 549 U.S. at 212 (“In a series of recent cases, 
we have explained that courts should generally not depart from 
the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of 
perceived policy concerns.”).  Absent an explicit or implicit 
justification contained in the PLRA itself for deviating from 
the usual procedural practice under Rule 15, Bock directs that 
we must set aside such concerns.  See id. at 212–14. 
                                                 
24 The changing of a plaintiff’s status is less a policy concern 
than a practical administrative consideration.  But it seems to 
us a fairly straightforward exercise to assess an individual’s 
status as a prisoner or non-prisoner—and hence the 





In support of their view that we should affirm the 
District Court’s judgment, the Medical Defendants rely 
primarily on the “express language of the PLRA”—namely, its 
“[n]o action shall be brought” language.  Khatri Supp. Br. 16.  
But, as we have discussed, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that this language is “boilerplate” and does not compel a 
conclusion that the usual procedural rules no longer apply.  
Bock, 549 U.S. at 220.  The Medical Defendants point to 
nothing within the language of the PLRA directing a deviation 
from the usual operation of Rule 15.  See Bock, 549 U.S. at 
214. 
Also in support of their view, the Medical Defendants 
rely on Ahmed, arguing that Garrett’s release does not free him 
from application of the PLRA, including its exhaustion 
requirement.  They cite Ahmed for a general proposition that a 
released prisoner cannot employ Rule 15 to show that his 
release renders the PLRA inapplicable.  But as we have already 
discussed, their argument erroneously extends Ahmed beyond 
its post-judgment posture and puts it in tension with the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Bock.  We cannot agree with this 
interpretation. 
The Medical Defendants also point to the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d at 970.  There, 
a group of inmates filed a civil suit under the PLRA but, by the 
time the District Court entered judgment, more than half of the 
plaintiffs had been released.  The question before the Harris 
Court was whether the PLRA’s provision stating that “[n]o 
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . without 
 36 
 
a prior showing of physical injury,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), 
continued to apply to the released prisoners. 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the PLRA’s “[n]o 
. . . action may be brought” language refers specifically and 
exclusively to the initial commencement of the lawsuit.  
Harris, 216 F.3d at 974.  The released prisoners did not 
properly file an amended or supplemental complaint to reflect 
their release, but the Harris Court held that an amendment or 
supplement would have made no difference because “the 
confinement status of the plaintiffs at any time after the lawsuit 
is filed is beside the point.”  Id. at 981. 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, its interpretation of 
the PLRA is consistent with Rule 15: 
In proper circumstances and when the 
requirements contained in Rule 15 are met, the 
rule does permit amendments or supplements to 
pleadings in order to bring to the attention of the 
court changes in the facts, but other law—in this 
instance [the PLRA]—determines whether those 
changes in the facts make any difference.25 
                                                 
25 Indeed, the Harris Court observed that, if the PLRA conflicts 
with Rule 15, then “the rule would have to yield to the later-
enacted statute to the extent of the conflict.”  216 F.3d at 982.  
We agree with this basic principle, which is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bock.  See Bock, 549 U.S. at 216 
(“[W]hen Congress meant to depart from the usual procedural 
requirements, it did so expressly.”).  We do not share the 
Eleventh Circuit’s view, however, that the PLRA expressly 
overrides Rule 15 with regard to the administrative exhaustion 




Id. at 982.  But because the point of reference is the time of the 
original filing, ostensibly curative Rule 15 amendments or 
supplements are irrelevant to the viability of the suit. 
 We decline to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis.  
Harris, which was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bock, purports to rely on the “plain and ordinary 
meaning” of the language of the PLRA—namely, the “[n]o . . 
. action may be brought” language.  Id. at 974.  In Bock, the 
Supreme Court described the nearly identical language of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion provision as “boilerplate language” that 
should not “lead to the dismissal of an entire action if a single 
claim fails to meet the pertinent standards.”  Bock, 549 U.S. at 
220.  Applying Bock, as we must, we cannot agree with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation.  The PLRA is not sufficiently 
plain in its meaning to override the usual operation of Rule 15.  
See id. at 214. 
 In sum, we conclude that there is nothing in the PLRA 
to indicate that a plaintiff cannot employ Rule 15 to file a 
supplemental pleading to cure an initial filing defect.  Because 
Garrett filed the TAC as a non-prisoner, administrative 
exhaustion was not an appropriate basis for its dismissal.  We 
will therefore vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Garrett’s 
claims against the Medical Defendants for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
                                                 
with Bock and its characterization of the “[n]o action shall be 




We turn next to Garrett’s claims in the FAC against the 
Corrections Defendants, which the District Court dismissed for 
failure to satisfy Rule 8.  We review the dismissal for abuse of 
discretion.26  In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 
(3d Cir. 1996); Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 
(7th Cir. 2001); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1217 (3d ed. 2019). 
In conducting our review, we must keep in mind the 
principles that guide the exercise of that discretion.  At the 
outset, we recognize that the decision to dismiss a complaint 
should not be entered lightly because it “forecloses inquiry into 
the merits.”  Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ’n, Inc., 370 F.2d 
795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967).  We also note that it is an abuse of 
discretion to dismiss an entire complaint if it contains some 
claims that satisfy Rule 8.  See Frazier v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 
785 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by 
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) and Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (reversing the dismissal of 
                                                 
26 Garrett asserts that we should conduct a de novo review of 
whether the District Court applied the proper liberal pleading 
standard to Garrett’s FAC.  Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 
339 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011).  He is wrong.  The District Court 
correctly identified the liberal construction standard applicable 
to Garrett’s pro se pleadings.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 
89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We therefore consider whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in applying that standard, 
not the legal question of whether the District Court employed 
the correct standard in the first instance. 
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the entire complaint as “broad and conclusory” where the 
complaint set forth four claims with adequate specificity).  
Perhaps most importantly here, we recognize that Garrett was 
proceeding without the assistance of counsel at the time he 
filed the FAC. 
“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(e).  This already liberal standard is “even more 
pronounced” where a plaintiff files the complaint without the 
assistance of counsel.  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 
(2007) (per curiam); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d 
Cir. 2004); Schaedler, 370 F.2d at 798.  Courts are more 
forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or 
somewhat lengthy complaints.  Wright & Miller, supra, 
§ 1217.  This practice is driven by an understanding that a court 
must make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants 
from the inadvertent forfeiture of important rights due merely 
to their lack of legal training.  See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 
333,339 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Ultimately, the question before us is not whether we 
might have chosen a more lenient course than dismissal in the 
first instance, but rather whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in ordering the dismissal.  Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 
702. 
A. 
Rule 8 imposes “minimal burdens on the plaintiff at the 
pleading stage.”  Frazier, 785 F.2d at 67.  Under Rule 8(a)(2), 
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  Further, Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach 
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
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P. 8(d)(1).  Fundamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint 
provide fair notice of “what the . . . claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.”  Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).  The 
rule “ensure[s] that claims [are] not filtered for merit at the 
pleading stage, but [are] determined on their merits rather than 
through missteps in pleading.”  J. Moore, 2 Moore’s Federal 
Practice § 8.04[1][a] (3d ed. 2019). 
To satisfy the rule, a complaint must make a showing 
sufficient to justify moving past the pleading stage.  Phillips v. 
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–235 (3d Cir. 2008).  
“[T]his obligation is not burdensome, but it is nonetheless an 
essential obligation.”  Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the 
Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to 
Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 609 (2006).  The 
claim must have “facial plausibility,” which means that the 
“plaintiff [must] plead[] factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009).  Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient. See 
id. at 678–79 (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of 
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 
conclusions.”).  Rule 8 thus requires that the pleading “possess 
enough heft” to demonstrate an entitlement to relief.  Bell 
Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 557. 
In assessing whether a pleading satisfies Rule 8, there is 
no bright-line rule to be applied.  “Inevitably, the sufficiency 
of a complaint must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”  
Frazier, 785 F.2d at 68.  The circumstances surrounding the 
particular pleading, including the nature of the action, the sort 
of relief being sought, the availability of information, and other 
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practical considerations must guide the inquiry into whether 
the litigant’s statement of his claim qualifies as “short and 
plain.”  See Wright & Miller, supra, § 1217.  Put simply, 
“judging the sufficiency of a pleading is a context-dependent 
exercise.”  W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 
F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 
F.3d 320, 326 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rule 8 “operate[s] with 
contextual specificity.”). 
B. 
We first consider Rule 8’s “short” statement 
requirement.  Certainly, there can be no single “proper length” 
for stating a particular claim.  The level of factual detail will 
vary with the complexity of the claim asserted.  Moore, supra, 
§ 8.04[1][d].  But a district court acts within its discretion when 
it dismisses an excessively prolix and overlong complaint, 
particularly where a plaintiff declines an express invitation to 
better tailor her pleading.  For instance, in Westinghouse, we 
concluded that the District Court properly exercised its 
discretion in dismissing counsel’s 240-page, 600-paragraph 
complaint that included a 50-plus-page “overview” of the 
allegedly wrongful conduct.  90 F.3d at 703.  We observed that 
the Westinghouse complaint was “unnecessarily complicated 
and verbose.”  Id.  And notably, the District Court had not 
dismissed the complaint outright, but rather directed the 
plaintiffs to submit a third amended complaint “containing 
only those allegations relevant to what were, in the court’s 
view, the remaining viable claims.”  Id.  We viewed the District 
Court’s actions as “mak[ing] a tremendous amount of sense” 
given the state of the original complaint and Rule 8’s goal of 
 42 
 
encouraging litigation on the merits, even though the plaintiffs 
had declined the opportunity to amend.  Id. 
Next, we turn to the “plain” statement requirement, 
which prompts us to ask whether, liberally construed, a 
pleading “identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken 
by these defendants” in regard to the plaintiff’s claims.  See 
Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019) (per 
curiam).  Naturally, a pleading that is so “vague or ambiguous” 
that a defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond to it 
will not satisfy Rule 8.  Schaedler, 370 F.2d at 799; see also 
Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995).  And, of 
course, “[t]he dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is 
unintelligible is unexceptional” because it cannot satisfy the 
basic notice function of a pleading.  Ruby Foods, 269 F.3d at 
820 (citing Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 
1988)).   
A statement of a claim may be “plain” even if it does 
not include every name, date, and location of the incidents at 
issue.  See Frazier, 785 F.2d at 68 (“While plaintiffs may be 
expected to know the injuries they allegedly have suffered, it 
is not reasonable to expect them to be familiar at the complaint 
stage with the full range of the defendants’ practices under 
challenge.”); see also Harnage, 916 F.3d at 142 ( “[T]he failure 
to allege specific dates does not necessarily run afoul of Rule 
8, especially where . . . the plaintiff lacks ready access to his 
medical records.”).  Missing details or superfluous material do 
not necessarily render a complaint unintelligible.  Indeed, even 
if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous information, a 
pro se complaint’s language will ordinarily be “plain” if it 
presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can 
respond on the merits.  Alston, 363 F.3d at 234; Bethea v. Reid, 
445 F.2d 1163, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Ruby Foods, 269 
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F.3d at 820 (pro se complaint, though prolix, “appears to state 
a claim that would withstand challenge under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6)”); Simmons, 49 F.3d at 87–88 (concluding that 
“[t]hough perhaps some details [were] lacking” and 
“extraneous details” were included, “it [was] evident that 
defendants understood the nature of Simmons’s claims” based 
on their response to it). 
Paying heed to the foregoing principles, the Seventh 
Circuit has held that a district court abuses its discretion when 
a pro se complaint is dismissed “merely because it contains 
repetitious and irrelevant matter,” so long as that “disposable 
husk [surrounds] . . . a core of proper pleading.” 27  Ruby Foods, 
269 F.3d at 820.  Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that 
dismissal of pro se complaints “is usually reserved for those 
cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, 
vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, 
is well disguised.”  Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. 
C. 
It is apparent that the District Court abused its discretion 
in ordering dismissal here.  The claims in Garrett’s pro se FAC 
are sufficiently “short” and “plain,” and the FAC adequately 
puts a number of the defendants on notice of Garrett’s claims 
and makes a sufficient showing of enough factual matter (when 
                                                 
27 The Seventh Circuit recognized that this proposition is not 
without limits, implicitly acknowledging that burying a claim 
in an excessively lengthy complaint may violate Rule 8.  It 
therefore indicated its agreement with our Court’s dismissal of 
the 240-page complaint in Westinghouse.  Ruby Foods, 269 
F.3d at 821. 
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taken as true) to plausibly suggest that Garrett can satisfy the 
elements of his § 1983 claims.  See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235. 
Obviously, the 15-page FAC is drastically shorter than 
the 240-page complaint that was properly dismissed in 
Westinghouse, and shorter than even the 20-page complaint 
that survived dismissal in Ruby Foods.  It is apparent that 
Garrett followed the Magistrate Judge’s instruction that his 
TAC had been too lengthy (the FAC is less than half the TAC’s 
length because Garrett trimmed approximately 20 pages from 
it). 
Under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead a deprivation of a 
constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state 
law.  See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 
(3d Cir. 1997).  In the FAC, Garrett claims that the Corrections 
Defendants violated the Constitution by being deliberately 
indifferent to his serious medical needs and by retaliating 
against him.  Garrett provides factual allegations setting forth 
particularized descriptions of actions taken by several of the 
individual defendants that plausibly support these claims, 
including:  
• “On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff was being escorted by 
another inmate along the walkway, when Sgt. 
Woomer and Unit Manager Defelice told the inmate 
not to help or assist the Plaintiff. . . .  As Plaintiff 
attempted to comply and return without any 
assistance, Plaintiff eventually collapsed, striking 
the ground hard.  Sgt. Woomer witnessed this, and 
told plaintiff to ‘crawl like a dog.’”  JA 353. 
• “On April 24, 2014, 8:00 pm, Officer Hunt used 
Official Oppression and the intimidation of a 
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witness.  Officer Hunt called plaintiff [racial slur] 
and threatened to block card him if he was seen 
having an inmate assist him.”  JA 355. 
• “On May 11, 2014.  Plaintiff had experienced chest 
and back pain and could not stand for count.  
Plaintiff informed Block C.O. McClellan, who in 
turn notified the medical department.  It took them 
75 mins to respond.  Nurse Rich arrived with a 
wheelchair at FA-Unit cell 6.  Nurse Rich stated that 
they were going to intentionally alter his medical 
file, and he would be returned to the housing unit.”  
JA 354. 
• “On May 11, 2014 Plaintiff’s medical file was 
altered, ECG reports were destroyed by Nurse 
Barnes.  Plaintiff suffered disregard for his health 
and safety as well as the ignoring of a serious 
medical need had been shown.”  JA 355. 
• “On June 15, 2014 between 1:30 and 2:00 pm, Sgt. 
James came to cell 6 and opened the door while 
Plaintiff was sleeping. Plaintiff’s cell mate . . . 
witnessed Sgt. James slap Plaintiff in the chest as he 
was sleeping.  Sgt. James[’s] demeanor and behavior 
was vindictive, and he told the Plaintiff the 
misconduct from earlier.  This action was caught on 
surveillance cameras aimed at cell 6.”  JA 355.  
• “On July 9, 2014 Plaintiff suffered a fall in the all-
metal accessible shower because he was denied his 
assistive devices. Officers McClellan, Hunt, Sgt. 
Young, and unit manager Barber did not allow 
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Plaintiff to use the handicapped accessible shower 
facility.”  JA 355. 
Notwithstanding their argument that Garrett’s FAC was 
deficient, the Corrections Defendants nevertheless respond to 
the merits of several of his claims in their appellate brief.  They 
argue, for instance, that Woomer and DeFelice “cannot be 
faulted for following doctor’s orders,” Hunt and Woomer 
cannot be held liable because insults and epithets are “not 
actionable under Section 1983,” and Nurse Barnes can be 
accused of nothing more than medical malpractice in 
administering the EKG.  Corr. Def. Supp. Br. 21–23.  
Similarly, they contend that Garrett’s fall in the shower does 
not plausibly rise to the level of a constitutional violation 
because it is “actionable, at best, as a slip and fall negligence 
case sounding in tort.”  Id. at 24.  Without addressing the 
validity of the Corrections Defendants’ arguments,28 we 
believe their brief demonstrates that it was possible to 
understand and engage with Garrett’s claims on their merits.  
See Ruby Foods, 269 F.3d at 820 (suggesting that any claim 
that may survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge meets the pleading 
requirements of Rule 8).   
                                                 
28 The Corrections Defendants did not move in the District 
Court to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and never otherwise presented these merits-
based arguments.  Accordingly, we will not address them in the 
first instance on appeal.  See Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 638 
F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (generally, an argument not 





We also observe that two of these claims (the June 15, 
2014 slap on the chest and the July 9, 2014 fall in the shower) 
were administratively exhausted within the prison grievance 
system before Garrett filed the FAC.  Garrett used similar 
descriptions in the FAC to those in his prison grievances.  
Tellingly, the Grievance Officer was able to discern Garrett’s 
claims and to pass upon their merits.  When the same claims 
appeared in Garrett’s FAC, the Corrections Defendants should 
have likewise been able to understand them and formulate a 
substantive response.   
The Corrections Defendants contend that we should 
uphold the District Court’s Rule 8 dismissal because Garrett 
previously had been given several opportunities to amend.  
They argue that Garrett is “incapable or not willing to abide by 
the Court’s instructions.”  Corr. Def. Supp. Br. 26.  We 
disagree.  It is apparent that Garrett made a genuine effort to 
revise his FAC to respond to the Magistrate Judge’s critique of 
the TAC.  This is simply not a case in which leave to amend 
was previously given and the successive pleadings “remain 
prolix and unintelligible.”  See Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. 
D. 
In conclusion, there are claims in Garrett’s pro se FAC 
against the Corrections Defendants that satisfy the “short and 
plain statement” requirement.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  While 
the complaint is far from perfect, we cannot agree with the 
Magistrate Judge’s assessment, adopted by the District Court, 
that “Plaintiff’s factual and legal allegations are, to a 
substantial extent, incomprehensible” and that the FAC 




We are always mindful that the abuse of discretion 
standard of review is highly deferential.  And we are not 
unsympathetic to the difficulties and frustrations the 
Magistrate Judge experienced in managing a case that involved 
various iterations of a complaint.  Yet we simply cannot 
conclude that the District Court’s sweeping dismissal of all the 
claims in the FAC was a proper exercise of discretion.  We will 
therefore vacate and remand the matter for further 
proceedings.29  
                                                 
29 Our conclusion that the District Court erred by dismissing 
the FAC under Rule 8 should not be construed as a 
determination on our part that there are no appropriate bases 
for dismissal of some or all of the claims against the 
Corrections Defendants in the FAC.  For instance, if certain 
defendants were not timely served, the claims against them 
might properly be subject to dismissal under Rule 4(m).  In 
addition, there may be valid arguments that Garrett has failed 
to state a claim against some or all of the Corrections 
Defendants, and so dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) could be 
warranted.  Finally, it is possible that Rule 8 might be 
employed surgically as to certain specific defendants if no 
“short and plain” statement of a claim is discernable.  Yet here, 
because it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss all of the 
claims against the Corrections Defendants for failure to 
comply with Rule 8 when it is apparent that some claims satisfy 
the rule, we will vacate the dismissal and remand to the District 
Court to carefully consider those possibilities if and when they 




 For all of the reasons discussed, we will vacate the 
dismissal of the claims against the Medical Defendants for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the dismissal of 
the claims against the Corrections Defendants for failure to 
comply with Rule 8.  We will remand the matter for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
